Cross-Border Targeted Killings:  Lawful but Awful ? by Brooks, Rosa
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2014 
Cross-Border Targeted Killings: "Lawful but Awful"? 
Rosa Brooks 
Georgetown University Law Center, rosa.brooks@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 




38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 233-250 (2014) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the International Law Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, National 
Security Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
 CROSS-BORDER TARGETED KILLINGS:  
“LAWFUL BUT AWFUL”? 
ROSA BROOKS* 
Since September 11, the United States has waged two very 
open wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These two wars have killed 
nearly 7,000 U.S. military personnel and left some 50,000 Ameri-
can troops wounded; they have also left an unknown number of 
Iraqi and Afghan soldiers and civilians dead or wounded.1 But 
alongside these two costly and visible wars, the United States 
has also been waging what amounts to a third war.  
This third war is a secret war, waged mostly by drone strikes, 
though it has also involved a smaller number of special opera-
tions raids.2 I call this third war a secret war, because though its 
existence is widely known, it remains officially unacknowledged 
by the government of the United States: In court filings, for in-
stance, the United States continues to state that it will neither 
confirm nor deny its involvement in drone strikes outside of tra-
ditional battlefields.3 
                                                                                                                                         
 * Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Senior Fellow, 
New America Foundation. This essay was adapted from remarks given at the 
2014 Federalist Society Annual Student Symposium at the University of Florida 
in Gainesville, Florida. 
 1. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
TE3M-UNT2] (last visited July 25, 2014); David Pogue, Iraq, Afghanistan War Wound-
ed Pass 50,000, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 25, 2012, 12:36 PM) http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/25/iraq-afghanistan-war-wounded_n_2017338.html 
[http://perma.cc/3RDZ-ZGRQ]. 
 2. Throughout these remarks, I use “U.S. drone strikes” as a shorthand way to 
refer to the expansive U.S. campaign of lethal, cross-border counterterrorist 
strikes outside of traditional, territorially defined battlefields. To be clear, howev-
er, the issue is not “drones” or “drone strikes;” drones are simply another way of 
delivering ordnance from a distance. The availability of armed unmanned aerial 
vehicles has enabled an expanded U.S. campaign of cross-border targeted killings, 
but my concern is with the expanded use of such targeted killings, rather than the 
specific platforms used to carry them out. 
 3. See Brief for Appellee, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013) (No. 11-5320), 2012 WL 1853574; Brief for Defendants-Appellants, New 
York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 13-422(L), 
13-445(CON)), 2013 WL 3171502. 
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We do not know what this secret war has cost us in dollars, 
and we do not know its cost in human lives, either.4 Drone 
strikes are appealing to the United States for the obvious reason 
that the use of unmanned aerial vehicles creates no short-term 
risk to the U.S. personnel who operate them. On the ground, 
however, U.S. drone strikes are estimated to have killed some 
3,000 to 4,000 people in at least three countries (Pakistan, Yemen 
and Somalia) and perhaps as many as half-a-dozen countries 
(including Mali, the Philippines, and perhaps Nigeria).5 For the 
most part, we do not know the identities of those killed by U.S. 
drone strikes, or the precise reasons they were targeted. We do 
not even know what percentage of the dead were specifically 
targeted, as opposed to those who simply became collateral 
damage in a U.S. strike aimed at someone else.6 
How should we evaluate this secret conflict, more than a 
decade after the September 11 attacks? There is a phrase that 
was coined by my friend and former professor, Harold Hongju 
Koh, former Dean of Yale Law School, and more recently the 
State Department’s Legal Advisor under President Obama. 
Harold Koh sometimes uses the term “lawful but awful,” 
though he does not apply that term to the drone war.7 In fact, 
Koh has been a staunch defender of the legal right of the ad-
ministration to wage this particular secret war.8 For me, how-
ever, this secret war fits squarely into in the “arguably lawful 
but nonetheless fairly awful” category. 
I say this for three very distinct reasons, although they all over-
lap to some extent. First, I think this secret war is deeply offensive 
to core principles of American democracy, in particular to any 
                                                                                                                                         
 4. Noah Shactman, Not Even the White House Knows the Drones’ Body Count, 
WIRED (Sept. 29, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/09/drone-body-
count/ [http://perma.cc/3WRU-EPWZ]. 
 5. See COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, THE CIVIL-
IAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 20 (2012); 
Declan Walsh, US Extends Drone Strikes to Somalia, THE GUARDIAN, June 30, 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/30/us-drone-strikes-somalia [http:// 
perma.cc/JHP9-468X]. 
 6. CENTER FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT, supra note 5, at 19–20. 
 7. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, “The Obama Admin-
istration and International Law,” Keynote Speech at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law 3 (March 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/179305.pdf [http://perma.cc/V94-
UA8A]. 
 8. Id. at 14–15. 
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notion of constitutional checks and balances. Second, I think it 
undermines core rule of law norms, internationally as well as 
domestically. And third, I think it is strategically misguided: At 
best, it is unhelpful; at worst, it is distinctly counterproductive. 
I. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
I begin with the issue of domestic law and democratic ac-
countability. Remember, our Constitution gives Congress vital 
powers relating to the use of military force. To Congress is giv-
en the power to declare war and the power to raise, support, 
and make rules regulating the armed forces and to make rules 
concerning “captures on land and water.”9 To Congress is also 
given the constitutional power to call forth “the militia to exe-
cute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel 
invasions,” 10  as well as the power to “define and pun-
ish . . . offenses against the law of nations.”11 
If I were a member of Congress right now, I would be hop-
ping mad. This secret war—which began under President 
Bush, but accelerated dramatically under President Obama—
has gotten us very far away from anything Congress contem-
plated in the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), 
passed just a few days after the September 11 attacks.12 
Go back and look at the language of the AUMF: It states that 
the President may “[U]se all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organi-
zations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of inter-
national terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.”13 
Note that although this language gives the executive branch 
authorization to use force, it does not authorize the use of force 
against anyone, anywhere, anytime. Rather, it authorizes the 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–12, 14. 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 12. This discussion of the AUMF draws on my 2013 congressional testimony. 
See Oversight: The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force, and the 2001 Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 
113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Rosa Brooks). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note). 
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use of force specifically and solely against those organizations 
and states that planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
September 11 attacks, or who harbored those who did. Fur-
thermore, the AUMF authorizes force for the sole purpose of 
preventing future terrorism against the United States by such 
organizations or states—not for the purpose of preventing all 
future bad acts committed by anyone anywhere. 
Even in those terrifying days right after September 11, when 
the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were still smolder-
ing and rescue personnel were still pulling corpses out of the 
wreckage, Congress rejected a request from the Bush admin-
istration to have a more expansive AUMF. The administration 
initially asked that Congress authorize the use of force to “de-
ter and preempt any future acts of terrorism or aggression.”14 
But even in that moment of grief, anger, and fear, Congress 
rightly rejected such an open-ended AUMF, understanding full 
well that when Congress cedes power to the executive branch, 
it generally never comes back.15 
For much of the last dozen years, the 2001 AUMF provided 
adequate domestic legal authority both for the conflict in Af-
ghanistan and for most U.S. drone strikes outside “hot battle-
fields,” since most of the individuals targeted in early U.S. 
strikes were reportedly senior Taliban or Al Qaeda operatives. 
But this appears to have changed in the last few years.16 
The threat has metastasized: even as U.S. military action has 
decimated “Al Qaeda Central” and the network of Taliban 
leaders most active in 2001, new extremist groups have 
evolved, some inspired by or affiliated with Al Qaeda and the 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. See 147 CONG. REC. S9950-51 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Byrd) (providing the text of the administration’s initial proposal); see also id. at 
S9949 (“[T]he use of force authority granted to the president extends only to the 
perpetrators of the September 11 attack. It was not the intent of Congress to give 
the president unbridled authority . . . to wage war against terrorism writ large 
without the advice and consent of Congress. That intent was made clear when 
Senators modified the text of the resolution proposed by the White House to limit 
the grant of authority to the September 11 attack.”). 
 15. Susan Milligan, Congress gives Bush power to hunt terrorists, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Sept. 15, 2001, http://www.boston.com/news/packages/underattack/globe_stories/ 
0915/Congress_gives_Bush_power_to_hunt_terroristsP.shtml [http://perma.cc/E4QC-
STBQ]. 
 16. Jonathan S. Landy, Obama’s drone war kills ‘others,’ not just al Qaida leaders, 
MCCLATCHY DC, April 9, 2013, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/09/188062/ 
obamas-drone-war-kills-others.html#.UZF-Xncq9QI [http://perma.cc/NZE2-54UV]. 
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Taliban, others linked merely by a similar extremist ideology 
and a similar willingness to use violence against civilian targets 
to achieve their ends.17 In the last few years, U.S. drone strikes 
outside of hot battlefields have consequently targeted not only 
the remnants of “core” Al Qaeda and the Taliban, but also 
known or suspected members of other organizations—
including Somalia’s al Shabaab—as well as various individuals 
identified by U.S. intelligence only as “militants,” “foreign 
fighters,” and “unknown extremists.”18 
For the moment, leave aside the question of whether the ex-
panding range of groups targeted by the United States all pose 
a threat (or the same degree of threat) to the United States. 
Maybe all these groups and individuals pose a threat to the 
United States, and maybe they don’t—but on its face, the 2001 
AUMF simply does not appear to cover groups and individuals 
that were unconnected to the September 11 attacks and are not 
planning or carrying out future terrorist attacks against the 
United States.19 
The Obama administration has countered this argument by 
asserting that insofar as Congress intended the AUMF to be the 
functional equivalent of a declaration of war, the AUMF must 
be read to include the implied law of war-based authority to 
target groups that are “associates” of Al Qaeda or the Taliban.20 
However, it is far from clear that Congress intended to author-
ize the use of force outside of traditional territorial battlefields 
against mere “associates” of those responsible for the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, particularly when many of those associated 
groups did not exist in 2001.21 It is also not clear how the execu-
tive branch defines “associates” of Al Qaeda.22 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University 
1–2 (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/ 
05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university [http://perma.cc/M5R3-7FHZ]. 
 18. Landy, supra note 16. 
 19. See Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 
note); Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
115, 115–16 (2014). 
 20. Rosa Brooks, Mission Creep in the War on Terror, FOREIGN POLICY, March 14, 
2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/14/mission_creep_in_the_war_ 
on_terror [http://perma.cc/QA9B-7VL4]. 
 21. Oona Hathaway et al., The Power To Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects 
After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 130–31 (2013). 
 22. The closest the administration has come is to describe an “associated force” 
as “(1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, 
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The international law of war unquestionably permits parties 
to a conflict to target “co-belligerents” of the enemy.23 On a tra-
ditional battlefield—such as within the territorial confines of 
Afghanistan—it would clearly be permissible for the United 
States to target individuals and groups that are literally 
fighting alongside the Taliban or Al Qaeda.24 It is less clear that 
this is the case outside “hot battlefields.” In this murkier con-
text, it is far more difficult to determine what would constitute 
“co-belligerency” with Al Qaeda, and executive branch officials 
have provided no clear criteria, nor even a simple list of those it 
regards as “associates” under a co-belligerency theory.25 
In effect, the administration’s assertion that the AUMF au-
thorizes the use of force against Al Qaeda “associates” even 
outside of traditional battlefields appears to have become a 
backdoor way of expanding the AUMF far beyond Congress’s 
intent. If Congress accepts Obama Administration claims that 
force can be used against a broad category of persons and or-
ganizations determined (based on unknown criteria) to be Al 
Qaeda “associates,” this effectively turns the AUMF into pre-
cisely the kind of open-ended authorization to use force that 
Congress rejected in 2001. 
Call it AUMF mission creep. In recent years, the United States 
has targeted more and more people with no apparent connection 
to Al Qaeda, no apparent connection to the September 11 at-
                                                                                                                                         
[and that] (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners.” Brief for the Appellants at 27–29, Hedges v. 
Obama, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3176), 2012 WL 5464206 (C.A.2) (quot-
ing Hon. Jeh Charles Johnson, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., “The Conflict 
Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?,” Speech Before the Oxford 
Union (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-
johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/ [http://perma.cc/2UX5-YU3A]). However, 
the quoted passage went on to state: “[T]he AUMF authorized the use of neces-
sary and appropriate force against the organizations and persons connected to the 
September 11th attacks—al Qaeda and the Taliban—without a geographic limita-
tion,” a broader description that calls into question the spatial limitations implied 
by “entered the fight alongside al Qaeda.” Id. 
 23. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2112–13 (2005). 
 24. Indeed, the AUMF notwithstanding, the United States would be justified 
under international self-defense principles in using force against persons or or-
ganizations posing an imminent threat to U.S. personnel, subject to the principles 
of necessity and proportionality. 
 25. Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 19, at 123 (“[T]he Executive Branch has . . . refused 
to publicly acknowledge what groups qualify as associated forces . . . . ”). 
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tacks, and increasingly with no apparent connection to any im-
minent threat to the United States (using a normal understand-
ing of the term imminent).26  
Does the shoehorning of all these various groups and indi-
viduals into the AUMF make U.S. drone strikes against them 
clearly “unlawful?” That is a stronger claim than I am prepared 
to make; the “associated forces” argument has a facial plausi-
bility. But we are assuredly stretching the law here. 
For most of our history, Congress has rightly been vigilant 
against executive usurpation of its constitutional prerogatives.27 
But over the last few years, Congress has sat by idly, allowing the 
executive branch to stretch the 2001 AUMF beyond all recogni-
tion. This is not a partisan issue at all, by the way; this is an issue 
of political cowardliness on the part of both parties, and frankly, 
the Democrats have been every bit as bad as the Republicans. 
To be clear, saying that many recent U.S. drone strikes do not 
seem to fit well under the AUMF umbrella is not the same as 
saying that the President lacks any constitutional authority to 
use force in the absence of express congressional authorization. 
I think there is no question that with or without an AUMF, the 
President clearly has the inherent constitutional power to use 
force against an imminent threat to the United States, no matter 
where and from whom it comes.28 Nonetheless, I think that that 
is a power that U.S. presidents have, generally speaking, used 
rarely (and for the most part wisely, with some notable excep-
tions). Here too, the secret drone war is perhaps best under-
stood as falling into the “lawful but awful” category. The use of 
force without clear, ongoing congressional authorization 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. See Michael Isikoff, Justice Department memo reveals legal case for drone strikes on 
Americans, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2013, 5:57 PM), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/ 
_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-
strikes-on-americans?lite [http://perma.cc/CC23-RTDG] (citing DOJ white paper 
stating: “The condition that an operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of 
violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have 
clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in 
the immediate future”). 
 27. See, e.g., Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REV. 83, 84 
(1993) (addressing historical context of decades of discontent over presidential 
usurpation of war powers that led to War Powers Resolution). 
 28. David Abramowitz, The President, The Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and Polit-
ical Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 71, 78 (2002) (“The Constitution is not a suicide pact, and the President has 
unchallenged authority to prevent an imminent threat to the United States.”). 
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should be the exception, not the norm. In recent years, howev-
er, the executive branch has normalized the use of force against 
an ever-expanding and ever more nebulous and geographically 
unbounded threat.29 This, I think, is dangerous. 
Recall that the United States is usually credited with the first 
modern codification of the rules of armed conflict.30 In 1863, 
President Abraham Lincoln signed General Order #100, “In-
structions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field”—better known as the Lieber Code—outlining the core 
rules of armed conflict with which he expected the Union Army 
to comply. In Article 29, the Lieber Code makes a bold declara-
tion: “Peace is [the] normal condition; war is the exception. The 
ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace.”31 
One might argue that the kinds of threat we face now just do 
not lend themselves to such a neat distinction between war and 
peace. I would agree. Nonetheless, this is no reason to throw all 
of our own democratic checks and balances out the window, or 
to throw rule-of-law principles out the window. On the contra-
ry: If the lines between what we have traditionally understood 
as “war” and “peace” are blurring, this is all the more reason to 
insist on the active engagement of Congress in decisions about 
the use of force. 
II. THE RULE OF LAW  
If the secret drone war poses challenges to our domestic sys-
tem of democratic checks and balances, it poses similar chal-
lenges to the international law of armed conflict and to core 
international rule of law norms. 
Here again, the issue is not one of manifest illegality:32 From 
an international law perspective, the United States has justified 
                                                                                                                                         
 29. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 22 (“[T]he AUMF authorized the use of neces-
sary and appropriate force against the organizations and persons connected to the 
September 11th attacks—al Qaeda and the Taliban—without a geographic limita-
tion.” (emphasis added)); Isikoff, supra note 26 (“imminent threat” does not re-
quire “clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take 
place in the immediate future”). 
 30. Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and 
the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 334 (2005). 
 31 . General Orders No. 100 art. 29 (April 24, 1863), available at http:// 
avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp [http://perma.cc/BB5Q-AS9C]. 
 32. I have discussed this issue in greater detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, 
Duck-Rabbits and Drones: Legal Indeterminacy and Targeted Killing, 25 STAN. L. & 
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strikes outside of hot battlefields on the theory that since Sep-
tember 11, the United States has been in an armed conflict 
against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces. The U.S. 
reading of the international law of armed conflict strikes me as 
perfectly plausible (though it is far from the only plausible 
reading of the law of armed conflict). It seems reasonable to 
view the September 11 attacks as an act of war, given the scale 
of death and destruction; I cannot see any logical reason to ar-
gue that armed conflicts can only exist between states. That 
makes no particular sense in today’s world. 
That being said, the U.S. decision to conceptualize U.S. rela-
tions with Al Qaeda as an “armed conflict,” though plausible, 
was not inevitable as a legal or policy matter. The United States 
could have used military force to respond to the September 11 
attacks under the international law of self-defense without 
choosing to declare the exchange of hostilities an “armed con-
flict.”33 The decision to view this as an armed conflict was a poli-
cy choice, not a decision somehow dictated by the law. Indeed, 
from an historical perspective it was in some ways a rather odd 
choice: As my Georgetown colleague Laura Donohue has noted, 
most governments have historically been quite reluctant to place 
attacks by insurgent groups or terror groups under the rubric of 
armed conflict, for fear of legitimizing these groups.34 Why give 
mass murderers such a soap box to stand upon? Calling Al 
Qaeda a combatant in war against the United States gave Al 
Qaeda a certain international prestige, and arguably helped it 
gain new recruits and funding.35 
Nonetheless, leaving aside the policy wisdom of calling this an 
armed conflict, from a strictly legal perspective, it was plausible 
for the Bush administration to argue that the law of armed conflict 
should apply to U.S. efforts to combat Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, 
                                                                                                                                         
POL’Y REV. 301 (2014); Rosa Brooks, Drones and the International Rule of Law,  28  J. 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 83 (2014). 
 33. See U.N. Charter art. 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.14, ¶ 193 (June 27). 
 34. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLI-
TICS, AND LIBERTY 7–10 (2008). 
 35. See Dana Priest & Josh White, War Helps Recruit Terrorist, Hill Told: Intelli-
gence Officials Talk of Growing Insurgency, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28876-2005Feb16.html 
[http://perma.cc/7ZZL-FQJP]. 
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the claim that the law of armed conflict is the applicable legal 
framework gave rise to far more problems than it resolved. 
There is, for instance, no obvious spatial boundary to an 
armed conflict with Al Qaeda. Since Al Qaeda is not a state, 
and its members plan, train, and act in numerous different 
states, it is hard to know the places in which the law of armed 
conflict applies.36 Presumably, if we accept the notion of an 
armed conflict with a geographically diffuse non-state actor to 
begin with, the armed conflict—and thus the law of armed con-
flict’s permissive rules relating to the use of lethal force—
travels with Al Qaeda members (and their “associates”).37 
This certainly appears to be the U.S. government’s theory: 
The law of war follows the enemy. Again, this is not an im-
plausible way to interpret that law—but its implications are 
frightening. If the armed conflict (and thus the law of armed 
conflict) exists wherever Al Qaeda or an Al Qaeda associate 
goes, the whole world is potentially a battlefield. 
There are also no obvious temporal boundaries to an armed 
conflict with Al Qaeda and its associates. When a war with Al 
Qaeda can morph so easily into a war with all its “associates,” 
many of whom operate within decentralized, non-hierarchical 
groups, how can the war ever “end?” But as I noted in the context 
of the AUMF, if we accept a conflict with no apparent spatial or 
temporal boundaries, we give to our executive branch a virtually 
open-ended ability to use lethal force, anywhere, any time.38 
Needless to say, it is also difficult to distinguish between those 
who can and cannot lawfully be targeted in an armed conflict 
with Al Qaeda and its associates. What precisely does it mean to 
be a combatant in such a non-traditional conflict? Are there 
members, or associates, or affiliates of Al Qaeda who would not 
be considered combatants, and thus must not be targeted under 
the laws of armed conflict? If so, who are those people? How do 
we define “civilian” in the context of a conflict with such a pro-
                                                                                                                                         
 36. See Jeremy Shapiro, The Foreign Policy Essay: Your Enemy Has a Name—How 




 37. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and 
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 745–46 (2004). 
 38. Id. at 745–46. 
No. 1] Cross-Border Targeted Killings 243 
 
tean non-state group? What constitutes “hostilities,” and what 
does it mean for a civilian to participate directly in hostilities? 
In an armed conflict with a geographically diffuse, non-
hierarchical non-state actor, we have no coherent or principled 
basis for answering any of these questions. This matters. It has 
implications for sovereignty, and implications for rights; after 
all, once we are in an armed conflict framework, many things 
that we consider illegal and immoral when we are not in an 
armed conflict become things that we consider legal and moral 
—indeed, even ethically required. When there is no armed con-
flict, you cannot go out on the street and kill the next person you 
see simply because you think he is your enemy. When there is 
an armed conflict, the rules change dramatically.39 This is the 
rule-of-law conundrum raised by the U.S. drone war: The char-
acter of U.S. drone strikes changes utterly, depending on which 
set of legal syllogisms you deem most plausible, yet there is no 
principled basis for picking one set of syllogisms over another. 
If you accept that the United States is in an armed conflict 
with Al Qaeda and its “associates”—and you accept that “asso-
ciates” is a fairly broad category, encompassing not only those 
organizations and individuals who have formally sworn alle-
giance to Al Qaeda but also all those whose activities appear 
coordinated with Al Qaeda or whose interests appear to align 
with Al Qaeda—and if you accept that the law of armed con-
flict travels wherever Al Qaeda and its associates travel—and 
that many individuals who do not look much like traditional 
combatants are still combatants for legal purposes—then drone 
strikes targeting assorted militants in Pakistan, Yemen, or So-
malia constitute lawful wartime strikes against legitimate ene-
my targets.40 
If you reject any of the steps in that chain of syllogisms, how-
ever—if you reject the armed conflict frame to begin with, or 
the broad understanding of associated forces, or the notion that 
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the rules of armed conflict apply in any place the enemy goes, 
for instance—then U.S. drone strikes look like simple murder.41 
How should we decide which category U.S. drone strikes fit 
into? Conceptually, this is a hard problem to begin with—and 
it is rendered still harder by the utter lack of transparency sur-
rounding U.S. strikes. If we (and the rest of the world) do not 
know how many strikes there have been, how many people 
have been targeted, the reasons and evidence behind U.S. tar-
geting decisions, where the strikes have occurred, and so on, 
how can we even begin to evaluate the legality, tmorality, or 
strategic wisdom of these strikes? 
I do not for one moment doubt the good faith of the U.S. 
government officials making the decisions on drone strikes. But 
at the end of the day, all that good faith notwithstanding, we 
now have a state of affairs in which our government—the gov-
ernment of a nation that was founded on the premise that all 
men are created equal, and endowed by their creator with cer-
tain unalienable rights, including the rights to life and liberty—
is claiming for itself the unreviewable power to kill any person, 
anywhere on earth, at any time, based on information that is 
secret and has been collected and evaluated according to secret 
criteria by anonymous individuals in a secret procedure.42 
If you think this is consistent with core rule-of-law norms, I 
urge you to go back and reread the Declaration of Independ-
ence. Go back and take a close look at the legal and ethical tradi-
tion that this nation was founded upon. The core notion of the 
rule of law is that all power must be constrained by law; even 
the state must be accountable to those it acts upon.43 If we truly 
believe in those “unalienable rights”—human rights, we would 
call them today—the lack of transparency and accountability 
characterizing U.S. drone strikes should chill us to the bone. 
It is of course true, as Michael Paulsen has observed, that an 
abuse is possible in any system of government, and one cannot 
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simply say that just because abuse is possible, a particular sys-
tem of government is wrong.44 But I would suggest that in 
some systems, abuse is much more likely than in other systems. 
Right now, we are in a situation in which the possibility of 
abuse has gone up dramatically. 
III. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
 I have argued that the U.S. drone war undermines our do-
mestic system of checks and balances, tipping an uncomforta-
ble amount of power to the executive branch. I have also ar-
gued that it is difficult to apply the law of armed conflict in a 
coherent or principled way to terrorist organizations we cur-
rently face, and that the lack of transparency and accountability 
surrounding U.S. drone strikes combines with this fundamen-
tal legal uncertainty to undermine core rule-of-law norms. But 
there is yet another reason to consider the U.S. drone war prob-
lematic: It is strategically foolhardy. U.S. drone strikes outside 
of traditional battlefields may achieve near-term tactical gains, 
but they also create substantial strategic risk.45 
Consider, for one thing, the precedent we are setting. I look at 
my former colleagues in the military, Department of Defense, 
and the intelligence community, and I think they are good peo-
ple, acting in good faith. Despite my rule-of-law concerns, I trust 
them to act carefully and responsibly, doing their best to avoid 
mistakes and not abuse their power. But there are a lot of other 
people in the world whom I do not trust at all, and when the 
U.S. asserts a unilateral right to use force in a secretive and un-
accountable way, we must consider that we are essentially hand-
ing every repressive and unscrupulous regime a playbook for 
how to violate sovereignty and get away with murder. 
Imagine how we would respond if Vladimir Putin decided to 
engage in an expanded drone strike campaign against political 
critics living outside of Russia’s borders. U.S. authorities would 
protest, of course, and insist on the importance of free expression, 
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due process, and human rights. But Putin would presumably re-
spond by taking a leaf from our book: He would refuse to confirm 
or deny any Russian strikes, while insisting that any Russian 
strikes that might or might not have occurred complied with all 
applicable law, and that any targeted persons were terrorists pos-
ing an imminent threat to Russian national security. The United 
States would demand evidence of this—but once again, Putin 
could simply echo the United States: It’s classified. Sorry. 
And what could we say? Let’s not kid ourselves: Do not imag-
ine that the legal arguments that the United States is now mak-
ing will not come back and bite us in the future. In fact, Putin 
has promised as much, in a context that is slightly different, but 
not entirely unrelated. Back when the United States recognized 
the unilateral declaration of independence made by Kosovo, 
Putin was unhappy; he argued that U.S. decision to disregard 
what Russia saw as Serbia’s right to sovereignty threatened to 
“blow apart the whole system of international relations,” and he 
warned that those states that had opted to recognize Kosovar 
independence should understand that their decision “is a two-
sided stick, and the second end will come back and hit them in 
the face.”46 That particular two-sided stick has already been de-
ployed by the Russians in the context of Ukraine and Crimea47—
and we should expect something similar with regard to U.S. le-
gal arguments justifying on targeted killings. 
We need to ask ourselves this: Do we want to live in a 
world in which every state considers itself to have a legal 
right to kill people in other states, secretly and with no public 
disclosure or due process, based on its own unilateral asser-
tions of national security prerogatives? Is it consistent with 
U.S. interests to usher in such a world? This is fundamentally 
a policy question, not a legal question. 
The legal precedents we are currently setting risk undermin-
ing the fragile norms of sovereignty and human rights that help 
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keep our world stable. But even beyond this, there is ample rea-
son to doubt the strategic wisdom of U.S. targeted killings.48 Re-
call former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s famous ques-
tion during the Iraq war: Are we creating new terrorists faster 
than we can kill them?49 This is the profound strategic question 
we need to ask about the U.S. targeted killing program today. 
For every U.S. drone strike that kills a terrorist, are we inspiring 
two new terrorist recruits? Are we alienating populations and 
governments whose support and cooperation we may need? Are 
our tactical successes leading to enduring strategic gains in our 
efforts to battle violent extremist groups, or are they actually 
undermining our longer-term security goals? 
It is difficult to answer these questions definitively, but I think 
that growing evidence suggests that the expansive U.S. targeted 
killing program may simply be making our problems worse. 
Numerous senior military and intelligence officials have raised 
these same questions.50 Can we really hope to kill our way out of 
a complex geo-political problem, one bad guy at a time? Today, 
Al Qaeda Central is no longer the threat it once was—but it has 
been replaced by new groups and new enemies, some amor-
phous, some increasingly centralized and lethal.51 As I write, an 
Al Qaeda offshoot so violent it was disowned by Al Qaeda itself 
has taken over large swathes of territory inside the borders of 
both Syria and Iraq, proclaiming an Islamic Caliphate; mean-
while, a resurgent Taliban is retaking territory in Afghanistan’s 
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Helmand Province.52 It is too soon to say if these efforts will be 
rolled back once again—but if nothing else, the evolving and 
expanding threat posed by these groups suggests that U.S. drone 
strikes are not achieving their strategic goals. 
That is why “lawful but awful” strikes me as a fairly apt de-
scription of the expansive U.S. targeted killing program we have 
seen in recent years. Strategically, the U.S. targeted killing pro-
gram is somewhere between unhelpful and downright self-
destructive—and while it is not manifestly illegal, neither is it 
consistent with core rule-of-law values or democratic principles. 
When a series of plausible legal propositions leads us to a 
situation in which we are so profoundly undermining core 
rule-of-law norms, it is time to admit that our legal framework 
is wholly inadequate. It is not doing the work we want it to do: 
It is not helping us draw some coherent lines to prevent the use 
of lethal force by states from becoming entirely unconstrained. 
We can do better. We could have a good deal more transpar-
ency and accountability than we currently have. This may be 
hard, but it is certainly far from impossible. There is a false 
choice that gets set up, where those disinclined to change any-
thing suggest that the choice is either unbounded state power 
or complete U.S. impotence in the face of even the gravest 
threats. I think that is plainly silly, and we need to reject such 
notions out of hand. 
Remember, the laws of armed conflict—and indeed our own 
Constitution and laws—were not handed down by a divine 
power. Humans created the legal frameworks we now live with, 
and humans can change them. We do not need to simply accept 
a situation in which law no longer has any real ability to restrain 
state power. If we need a different legal framework that does a 
better job of imposing some meaningful constraints, while sim-
ultaneously reflecting the need for flexibility in the face of non-
traditional threats, surely we are, collectively, smart enough to 
come up with something that does a better job than our current 
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legal framework. And do not fall for claims that if you take away 
the AUMF, the executive branch would lack the power to pro-
tect the nation. That is also silly. In a true emergency, the Presi-
dent clearly has the constitutional power and the international 
law right to act.53 The trick is this: How do we prevent the excep-
tion from swallowing up the norm altogether? 
Let me end with a plea to keep current security threats in 
perspective. The United States and its residents have faced 
threat and danger many times in the past. The English pilgrims 
who settled in Massachusetts faced shipwreck, disease, and 
starvation in their quest for religious freedom; half were dead 
by the end of the first winter, but those who remained perse-
vered.54 American pioneers crossed the Rocky Mountains, trav-
eling into the unknown in search of a better life; many did not 
make it.55 In the middle of the Nineteenth Century, the Civil 
War killed more than 600,000 Americans.56 Less than a century 
later, World War II killed more than 400,000 Americans.57 If 
you adjust for population size, these were horrific death tolls—
and yet, even in the face of these existential threats, we did not 
decide that we needed to give the executive branch wholesale 
authorization to use force against anyone, anywhere, anytime, 
permanently, without spatial or temporal limitations. 
Today, terrorism is a real threat. Al Qaeda is scary, and so are 
its offshoots, affiliates, associates, and the emerging extremist 
groups it has inspired. But as I said, we need to keep the current 
threat in perspective. Yes, we should be vigilant, particularly to 
ensure that terrorist groups (or irresponsible states) do not gain 
access to weapons of mass destruction. But we should also keep 
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in mind there has been no year except 2001 in which terrorism 
has killed more American citizens than lightning strikes.58 In 
fact, you are twelve times more likely to suffocate accidentally in 
your own bed than you are to be killed by terrorism.59 
This is not a reason to ignore or dismiss the threat of terror-
ism—but when a threat is distant and likely to be the exception, 
not the norm, let’s not start handing over our freedoms wholesale. 
The executive has emergency powers that can be used if and 
when a specific and grave terrorist threat arises. But in the mean-
time, is the threat of terrorism really so grave that we are willing 
to toss 200-plus years of American values out the window? 
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